In search of a telos: A critique of the performative green public sphere by Melo Escrihuela, C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/124662
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
IN SEARCH OF A TELOS: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE PERFORMATIVE GREEN PUBLIC SPHERE
Carme Melo Escrihuela*
carme.melo@uv.es
Th is paper addresses the relationship between environmental politics and the pub-
lic sphere. Th e focus is placed on the concept of the “green public sphere”, devel-
oped by Douglas Torgerson and very infl uential in green political theory. I argue 
that we should rethink Torgerson’s twin conceptions of environmental politics and 
the green public sphere. First, I review Torgerson’s Arendtian notion of the public 
sphere and explain why this view is limited as far as a transformative environmental 
politics is concerned. Drawing on the functions of public spheres in democratic 
theory, I stress that the merits of the green public sphere are to be evaluated not 
only in relation to the type of interaction they facilitate (rational-discursive), but 
especially to the extent that it is critical with power and infl uential on society and 
democracy. Th en, I delineate an alternative account of the green public sphere bet-
ter suited, in my opinion, to unfold its democratizing aspirations. To this end, I 
take into consideration Habermas’ notion and the further intellectual reactions it 
provoked.
Keywords: green public sphere, environmental politics, Torgerson, Arendt, public 
sphere theory.
Neste artigo trato da relação entre políticas do ambiente e esfera pública, colocando 
a ênfase na concepção de “esfera pública verde” de Douglas Torgerson - prepon-
derante na teoria política verde. Argumento que devemos repensar as concep-
ções congénitas de Torgerson de políticas ambientais e de esfera pública verde. 
Primeiramente, reviso a noção arendtiana de Torgerson de esfera pública e explico 
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os seus limites quando está em causa uma transformação das políticas ambien-
tais. Com base nas funções das esferas públicas na teoria democrática, gostaria 
de salientar que o mérito do espaço público verde deve ser avaliado não apenas 
em relação ao tipo de interacção que propicia (racional-discursiva), mas especial-
mente na crítica, poder e infl uência que exerce sobre a sociedade e a democracia. 
Seguidamente, esboço uma compreensão alternativa e mais adequada, na minha 
opinião, de esfera pública verde, dado desdobrar as suas aspirações democratizan-
tes. Para este fi m, levo em consideração a noção de Habermas e as reacções intelec-
tuais dela decorrentes. 
Palavras-chave: esfera pública verde, políticas ambientais, Torgerson, Arendt, teo-
ria da esfera pública
1. Introduction
Since the birth of contemporary ecologism, environmental thought and 
practice have triggered changes in discourses, societies and in the politi-
cal culture outside the state. Th ese transformations have crystallized in 
the consolidation of a green public sphere. Th e notion of the green public 
sphere has many nuances and can be associated with diff erent values and 
ideas. Yet it is oft en deployed to stress debate across diff erence and plurality. 
Sustainability is a matter of disagreement and confl ict. Competing visions 
of the ecological society coexist; diff erent paths could lead to it. Th e evolu-
tion of the green movement and environmental political thought provides 
evidence. A relatively homogeneous early ecologism - based on ecocen-
trism, limits to growth and decentralization - has given way to a collection 
of visions and values, from human-centred perspectives and environmen-
tal justice, to ecological modernization and the green state. Talk about a 
green ideology has become less common because basically all ideologies 
have embraced sustainability discourses to various extents (Saward et al., 
2009). In the face of this, current environmental political theory is highly 
concerned with expanding democracy. Given uncertainty about environ-
mental issues and the diversity of ecologisms, the safest position seems to 
be working towards a democratic system that encourages debate and allows 
all points of view to be equally considered. From this angle, achieving sus-
tainability means deepening democracy and consolidating green public 
spheres where active citizens engage in political discussion about socio-
natural relations. Th ose who praise the notion of the public sphere from 
a green politico-theoretical perspective stress the essential role it plays in 
accommodating disparate values and discourses (Yang & Calhoun, 2007; 
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Doyle & Doherty, 2006; Eckersley, 2004, 2005; Smith, 2003; Dryzek et al., 
2003; Brulle, 2000). 
Research on the public sphere and the environment unavoidably leads 
to Th e promise of green politics. Environmentalism and the public sphere 
(1999), where Douglas Torgerson develops the notion of the “green public 
sphere”.[1] Th is account has been very infl uential in green political theory, 
and that is why it constitutes the focus of this paper. In what follows, the 
importance of the idea of a public sphere for green political thought is 
examined. I argue that we should rethink Torgerson’s conception of envi-
ronmental politics and the green public sphere. First, I review Torgerson’s 
notion of the green public sphere and explain why this view is limited as 
far as a transformative environmental politics is concerned. Th en, I deline-
ate an alternative account of the green public sphere better suited, in my 
opinion, to unfold the democratizing aspirations of the public sphere. In 
order to redefi ne the green public sphere, I focus on the functions of pub-
lic spheres in democratic theory, and I take into consideration Habermas’ 
notion and the further intellectual reactions and developments it provoked.
2. Environmental politics and the green public sphere
Douglas Torgerson explains that the ecological critique of modernity 
includes a rejection of instrumental rationality, for the way it has led to 
the instrumentalization and domination of nature. But given the high lev-
els of environmental destruction and the urgency of pro-environmental 
action, Torgerson contends that, paradoxically, an instrumental approach 
has come to dominate ecological politics: “Th e point of political action is 
success in achieving green goals”, he laments (Idem, x). Th is is Torgerson’s 
departing realization. His work is an attempt to go beyond what he defi nes 
as green strategic thinking, to transcend ends-oriented environmentalism. 
And he fi nds a solution in Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics.[2] 
Th e German philosopher elaborates a non-strategic redefi nition of 
political action as debate with intrinsic value, as a performing art which 
has value in its performance, like music or drama. So the merits of politics 
are not to be found in its outcomes but in political action itself. Following 
1  See also Torgerson (2000, 2006, 2008, 2010).
2  Torgerson does not undertake a reading of the political thought of Hannah Arendt from 
an environmental perspective. For such analysis, which also falls outside the scope of this 
article, see Whiteside (1994; 1998), Macauley (1996), Szerszynski (2003) and MacGregor and 
Szerszynski (2004).
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Arendt’s account of politics as demanding the creation of a space for debate 
and the constitution of a “we” by the citizenry, Torgerson defi nes the green 
public sphere as a “space of appearance” (Idem, 17), a site to carry on 
political action formulated in terms of debate aimed at sustaining itself. 
Hence the green public sphere is not a physical location - like a gathering or 
assembly - or an institution, but a network of spaces for discourse. It is not 
restricted to a given country or territory.[3] A variety of interrelated places 
where people join together for the sole purpose of speaking and listening, 
to practise a green discourse, forms a green public sphere – understood as 
a cluster of public spheres.[4] From this perspective, the green public sphere 
is not a space for rational debate oriented towards agreement, but a cultural 
interplay of diff erent voices. Th e aim is to sustain a communicative process 
in which participants are committed to play indefi nitely, as debate is valued 
for its own sake.[5] Th is makes disagreement possible.
A green politics perceived as the project of building and maintaining a 
green public sphere is presented as an alternative to discussions about the 
“we”, that is, about the identity of the green movement, the defi nition of its 
ends and strategies. If the green public sphere is understood as a common 
place, then the unity derives, not from a set of shared values, goals and 
tactics, but from dwelling in a collective space. In this account, an “ideal-
ized we” - understood as a collective subject or Marxian historical agent - is 
replaced by a “partially existing we, capable of shared meaning” (Idem, 49, 
emphases in the original). So the metaphor of the green movement is mixed 
with the metaphor of the green public sphere.
Torgerson argues that when goals are introduced in debate, the theat-
rical and performative vanishes. Th e background of crisis in which envi-
ronmental thought and politics emerged denotes a sense of tragedy that is 
accentuated by the moralism and desperation of some forms of green dis-
course – he regrets. Torgerson wants to stress the importance of irony and 
comedy for a politics that refuses to end discourse and lacks of purpose of 
action. In his view, there is a comic, carnivalesque element to green politics, 
3  See Torgerson (2006) for a discussion on the global dimension of the green public sphere. 
4  As a correction of Habermas’ seminal formulation, feminist and postmodern theorists have 
envisaged a plurality of public spheres that allows diff erence. Th erefore a proliferation of public 
spheres is not seen as a sign of decline – as Habermas argued – but of democratic vitality. 
Following this standpoint, Torgerson claims that there is not a unitary and uniform green 
public sphere but a multiplicity of green public spheres.
5  Torgerson employs several metaphors to exemplify the never-ending nature of debate. For 
instance, he evokes a dance in which the goal is to learn how to dance properly in order to keep 
on dancing, or an infi nite game which players cannot stop playing (1999: 156-157).
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deployed with diff erent languages and diverse contexts to expose its own 
tragic dimension and to caricature the arrogant decisions of the adminis-
trative mind. He brings our attention to citizens representing the funeral of 
a river and to the activities of groups like Greenpeace. Th us the notion of 
rational discourse is expanded so as to include a mixture of voices: laugh-
ter, the comic, the fun, tragedy. Situationist performances, carnivals, the 
absurd, the spiritual, meditation, play, passion, dancing and music, all are 
privileged forms of communication in the green public sphere.
Let me spend a little time now contextualizing the green public sphere 
within Torgerson’s conception of environmental politics before going on to 
refl ect on the limitations and merits of his account. To do so, it is appropri-
ate to discuss Arendt’s political thought, which informs Torgerson’s nar-
rative. In Th e Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt draws a contrast 
between “labor”, “work” and “action”. Labor is the economic activity result-
ing from humans necessary exchange with nature. Work refers to the mak-
ing of artefacts and civilization, the non-natural aspects of human life. And 
action is human conduct, in the form of speech, through which individu-
als manifest themselves, perceive each other, and represent their diff erent 
identities and shared humanity. While labor and work have extrinsic ends, 
action is non-strategic and self-contained. Arendt regards action conceived 
as debate to be the key aspect of politics. 
Using Arendt’s tripartite scheme of the active life, Torgerson distin-
guishes three dimensions of politics: “functional politics” (related to labor), 
devoted to the creation and preservation of the social and economic sys-
tem; “constitutive politics” (corresponding to work), aimed at building 
“the cultural artifi ce of a civilization”, including its institutions, the identi-
ties of its inhabitants and the features of their discourse; and “performa-
tive politics” (action), theatrical and oriented to itself, to the value inherent 
to politics. Drawing on these categories, green functional politics would 
include reformist tendencies that seek to infl uence policy processes to make 
them more ecologically rational, while green constitutive politics would be 
related to radical social change. In Torgerson’s view, radical and reform-
ist approaches – unlike green performative politics - are instrumental and 
oft en neglect debate. When focusing on green performative politics, the 
labels radicalism and reformism no longer apply, since there is no instru-
mental action, Torgerson argues.[6]
6  Note that Torgerson’s conception of performative politics goes beyond that of Arendt. For 
Torgerson, the performative character of politics is not reduced to reason but includes dancing, 
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Torgerson believes that both environmental reformism and radicalism 
tend towards totalizing postures, since they are bound to either accepting or 
rejecting the existing order. He instead advocates an in-between position: 
incremental radicalism. Th is is a decentred account that allows diff erence, 
including an array of groups, networks and orientations – accommodating 
reform and radicalism. It is not a strategy since it does not indicate what it 
is to be done or the aims to be pursued. Th ere is room for building alliances 
but nothing points at unity and coherence. Torgerson states that more than 
any other type of environmental politics, incremental radicalism highlights 
the limitations of instrumental action and of rigid standpoints, enhancing 
the prospects for a green public sphere characterized by debate, diversity 
and disagreement. An example of this type of dispersed strategy would be 
the environmental justice movement, which does not have a centralized 
organization and covers a wide range of issues. 
Although Torgerson’s theory is a celebration of the performative con-
ception of politics, he acknowledges the functional and constitutive dimen-
sions of green politics. Th is becomes clear when he argues that the green 
public sphere “cannot be an arena of pure performativity – just a theatre 
appreciated for its own sake – but must also be concerned with outcomes 
relevant to its own construction and protection: to the project of building 
and shaping a green public sphere” (Torgerson, 1999: 20, emphasis added). 
So for these two types of politics – functional and constitutive - to be taken 
into account in Torgerson’s proposal, they have to include debate for its own 
sake – and so have intrinsic rather than extrinsic aims – or be seen as an 
instrument for the creation of the space of appearance that forms the green 
public sphere.
3. A critique of the performative green public sphere
Aft er having explained Torgerson’s twin notions of environmental poli-
tics and the green public sphere, it is my intention to point at the limita-
tions of his perspective. I shall develop a critique structured around two 
main aspects: the neglect of social issues and the lack of practical-political 
orientation. 
comedy and the carnivalesque. Th is gives a postmodern thread to his notion of the green public 
sphere. 
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Overcoming dualisms: the social and the political, the public and 
the private, instrumental and communicative reason
Th e fi rst corollary of Torgerson’s stress on the intrinsic value of politics is 
the peripheral role that he concedes to social issues. Torgerson asks us to 
accept that the end of environmental political theory should be the creation 
of a space for debate, and that other principles like pursuing social equality 
should be oriented to the creation of a we. Th is approach is infl uenced by 
Arendt’s theory, on which Torgerson draws. Th erefore it is relevant to refer 
to the Arendtian conception of social issues before proceeding to unveil the 
problems inherent to Torgerson’s work. 
For Arendt, political action conceived as an art with intrinsic value 
demands a public domain constituted for this purpose. Arendt believed that 
modern politics - unlike the Greek polis - lacks such a public space. She was 
concerned with the modern emancipation of economic aff airs from the pri-
vate realm occurred as a result of market relations and capitalism. With this 
transformation, economic issues became public matters, putting into ques-
tion the distinction between the public and the private domains. Th is process 
marked the erosion of public discourse, the decline of the political and “the 
rise of the social” (Arendt, 1958: 38). It triggered the transformation of the 
public fi eld of politics into an arena where citizens become consumers and 
producers, disconnected from political life and unconcerned with the com-
mon good. Subsequently the public space declined due to the rise of private 
interests (Benhabib, 1992; Calhoun, 2001). Arendt makes a clear distinction 
between the political or the world of free speech about issues of principle like 
freedom, participation and institutional organization, and the social, that is 
the arena for collective problems, inequality, poverty and environmental deg-
radation (Dryzek, 1990a: 19). Th erefore, in her account, the social is excluded 
from what is truly political, in as much as technocracy and policy-making 
(functional politics) are left  outside (Torgerson, 1999: 132-135). 
Arendt would regard functional politics as management and admin-
istration seeking the provision of basic needs. On the one hand, Arendt 
conceives administration as an evil responsible for the lack of meaningful, 
true politics. On the other hand, she welcomes the capacity of the state to 
provide for the satisfaction of everyone’s needs and create opportunities 
for political action. In Arendt’s view, basic needs and issues of social pol-
icy concern governments. Th ey are not a matter of public debate, of opin-
ion, but have to be dealt with by experts and bureaucrats, because there is 
nothing to argue or disagree about: they must be guaranteed. In placing 
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socio-economic decisions within the administrative sphere (and not within 
the public sphere), Arendt confi nes them to the arena of what Torgerson 
defi nes as functional politics (Torgerson, 1999: 131-135). For her, social 
and collective problems can only be solved through instrumental rational-
ity. Accordingly, if the public sphere of politics is to be preserved as a sphere 
for communicative rationality, then there is no room in it for social prob-
lem solving. As Dryzek observes, it seems that for Arendt “there should be 
no more to politics than talk” (1990a: 53).
Following Benhabib (1992) and Dryzek (1990a), it can be objected that 
Arendt’s account of politics and the public space is based on three related 
misconceptions, to which I now turn to: (i) the social-political dichotomy in 
modern democratic life, (ii) the consideration of issues of justice as private 
matters, and (iii) the opposition between communicative and instrumental 
forms of rationality. I suggest that these three issues infl uence Torgerson’s 
model of the green public sphere, as I shall show.
(i) Under conditions of modernity, the distinction between the social 
and the political no longer applies. Th is is not because the administrative 
sphere pervades the public sphere, replacing politics with economic rela-
tions - as Arendt would claim - but because as formerly excluded subjects 
(like women, workers and racial minorities) gain access to the public space, 
their concerns are politicized and incorporated into the public arena. Th e 
Ancient model of the public space and politics that Arendt praises was 
based on the exclusion of large groups (including women, children, non-
Greeks and slaves) whose labour made it possible for privileged citizens to 
devote to the “leisure for politics”. Since the emancipation of these groups 
from the private domain led to the rise of the social, in Arendtian terms, her 
exclusion of the social may be taken as a neglect of political universalism. 
So the project of building a public space under conditions of modernity 
appears as an “elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be recon-
ciled with the demand for political emancipation and the universal exten-
sion of citizenship rights…” (Benhabib, 1992: 75). Dryzek reaches the same 
conclusion when he argues that Arendt’s account of politics is discursive 
but “hardly democratic”, since, like in ancient Athens, politics is left  for “a 
self-selected elite” (Dryzek, 1990a: 19-20).
(ii) Arendt fails to acknowledge that “the struggle to make something 
public is a struggle for justice” (Benhabib, 1992: 79). Th e emancipation of 
workers that brought issues of property onto the public agenda, and the 
emancipation of women that made household relations enter the political 
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arena, were struggles to bring those previously considered social and pri-
vate issues into the public domain of politics. Insofar as they are mediated 
by power relations, these issues are not private preferences but questions of 
public justice. According to Benhabib, “[t]o make issues of common con-
cern public...means making them accessible to discursive will formation, it 
means to democratize them” (Idem, 94). 
Due to these two misconstructions, Benhabib argues that Arendt holds 
an “essentialist” conception of the public space, defi ned as a site for one 
particular form of activity (action) and only one distinct content of debate 
(politics understood in narrow terms). Th is view of the public sphere 
excludes the worlds of labor and work (to which economic relations and 
technology belong to, and where most environmental problems originate) 
and confi nes them either to the private domain of preferences or to the 
instrumental administrative sphere. Yet labor and work can and should 
become issues of public discussion in the political public sphere, and be 
“refl exively challenged and placed into question from the standpoint of the 
asymmetrical power relations governing them” (Idem, 80).
(iii) Finally, Arendt assumes a clear separation between instrumen-
tal and communicative forms of rationality. But these two types of reason 
are not necessarily divided and do not always stand in opposition to each 
other; indeed they can coexist. Communicative rationality and discursive 
democracy can be found within the domain of what Arendt would defi ne 
as instrumental rationality, like problem solving and certain forms of pol-
icy-making. Although communicative rationality deals with interpersonal 
discourse and can be used to arrive at normative principles beyond a strict 
focus on means, it also refers to coordination of actions. In fact, communi-
cative rationality can be applied to social problem solving, as social prob-
lems involve values. In Dryzek’s words, “[i]f problems can only be solved 
through purely instrumental action, then clearly problem solving has no 
place in the critical theory program” (1990a: 53). 
I wish to go back to Torgerson to disclose how these three miscon-
ceptions shape and limit his work. Torgerson accepts that communica-
tive rationality can develop in the domain of instrumental rationality. He 
identifi es situations in which debate and politics with intrinsic value can 
be found in functional and constitutive political action. However, he does 
not reject Arendt’s social-political dualism, which underpins her distinc-
tion between instrumental and communicative rationality, since he is con-
cerned with affi  rming the intrinsic value of politics as debate about itself. 
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Th e use of an Arendtian framework limits Torgerson’s green theory of the 
public sphere in diff erent ways. First and foremost, Torgerson’s account 
is characterized by a general exclusion of social and economic aspects on 
the grounds that they belong to the terrain of strategic politics. And when 
exceptionally included, a functional conception defi nes them as means to 
the ends of communicative rationality and the expansion of the green pub-
lic sphere. Th e role Torgerson assigns to social and economic concerns is 
to create the conditions needed for rational discourse to fl ourish and “to 
make the community-communication something more than a vague hope” 
(1999: 124). On the one hand, he would argue, basic needs ought to be 
met as a precondition for one’s engagement in the vita activa. On the other 
hand, those suff ering basic shortages are more likely to violate the postu-
lates of the communication process. As part of the incremental radicalism 
he endorses, Torgerson contemplates the design of economic and social 
policies, like the basic income, aimed at reducing citizens’ vulnerabilities 
and fears that prevent them to focus on environmental issues (2000: 15). 
Th ese types of measures would, in his view, contribute to the enhancement 
of the green public sphere, since they could encourage citizens’ engagement 
in public spirited talk about environmental issues. 
Yet this approach suggests that social and economic wellbeing do not 
have intrinsic value as social objectives, and that they can be accepted as 
valid topics of debate only insofar as they are means to realize the perform-
ative value of politics. Consequently, Torgerson fails to acknowledge that 
what he regards as instrumental are, in fact, issues of public justice, issues of 
power. Th erefore, they have to be democratized and made subject of collec-
tive debate in the green public sphere, not so much because they contribute 
to the expansion of the green public sphere, as Torgerson may accept, but 
because they are collective, social aims. So achieving social equality has to 
be included and addressed in the green public sphere as a way of confront-
ing authority and opposing those institutions that perpetuate relations of 
domination and injustice.
Like the Arendtian public space, the green public sphere envisaged by 
Torgerson is based on an essentialist conception. It is a site for only one 
type of political activity, debate; and only one type of debate, one that is 
self-referential. Nancy Fraser makes a distinction between a proceduralist 
notion of the public sphere that conceives it as a locus for “certain types of 
discourse interaction”, and a substantive defi nition focusing on the pub-
lic sphere as a space for discussion about particular problems (1992: 142). 
Following this distinction, it could be argued that Torgerson understands 
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the green public sphere in procedural terms, in the sense that what matters 
for him is that debate be conducted in a particular fashion, that is, focused 
on itself, following the rules of communicative ethics, regardless of out-
comes. Th e lack of concern for extrinsic, valuable goals (like social equality 
and justice, reduced in Torgerson’s theory to means to achieve communi-
cative rationality or to celebrate the value of politics) restricts the scope of 
debate in the green public sphere to political issues defi ned in a narrow 
sense. Th is, in turn, leads to a neglect of the potential of the green pub-
lic sphere for bringing about social and environmental change. If issues of 
power and ends-oriented action are not brought into the public realm, then 
the green public sphere risks becoming a club for a selected elite, like the 
ancient Greek polis and the Arendtian public space. 
Despite the above assertions, the position of socio-economic issues in 
Torgerson’s theory can be read along diff erent lines. He contends that we 
would recognize that a green public sphere has emerged, amongst other 
possible signs, when the media were promoting sustainability rather than 
consumption. Another indicator of the generation of a green public sphere 
would be the displacement of privileged industrialism by discourses such as 
the unequal distribution of environmental costs according to race, class and 
gender, and the real environmental impact of every product. Th is shows 
an interest in discourses with a social and environmental justice dimen-
sion. However, even if one accepts that social, economic, and justice related 
issues are taken into account as aims of debate in the green public sphere, 
for Torgerson these are simply discourses. And, unfortunately, he does not 
seek to encourage ways to make these discourses lead to transformative 
action, because this would result in the end of the green public sphere, 
according to his Arendtian understanding of political space. 
Beyond communication: the critical and democratizing functions of 
public spheres 
In eff ect, this is the second aspect of this paper’s critique of Torgerson’s 
theory: the lack of practical and political orientation (the fi rst is the neglect 
of social issues, with all its implications discussed so far). Two points have 
to be stressed. First, Torgerson does not entertain the idea that discourse 
and debate may lead to practice and to socio-environmental action. And, 
second, his rejection of strategic politics leads him to ignore the reverse 
possibility: that certain ends-oriented practices create new forms of knowl-
edge and green discourses that will then enter the green public sphere, 
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prompting more green public spheres. In Torgerson’s view, maintaining a 
green public sphere should be prioritized over the green movement’s activ-
ity. But if a green public sphere is rooted on diff erent fl ows of green dis-
courses that emerged as a result of ecological activism, then the importance 
of pro-environmental citizen, community and social movement activity 
cannot be underestimated. Let me explain in more detail the second limi-
tation in Torgerson’s account: the neglect of a practical focus. To do so, it 
is useful to introduce in the argumentation the issue of the public sphere 
functions in relation to democracy.
As Nancy Fraser asserts, “[t]he concept of the public sphere was devel-
oped not simply to understand communication fl ows but also to contribute 
to a critical theory of democracy” (2008: 76). Other democratic theorists 
like Craig Calhoun (1993) and Iris Young (2000) have argued too that the 
merits of the public sphere are to be assessed in the light of the extent to 
which it is critical-oppositional and infl uential. If this is accepted, it is not 
suffi  cient, then, that the green public sphere follows the rules of commu-
nicative rationality. Beyond the value of discursive processes and the qual-
ity of debate, the degree to which a green public sphere shall contribute 
to the promotion of democracy and justice depends, also, on the results 
achieved. 
Th rough its critical and oppositional functions, the public sphere chal-
lenges all forms of power and domination. Earlier I noted that attempts to 
broaden the range of issues included in the public sphere are struggles for 
justice and freedom. Torgerson’s overemphasis on the value of debate for 
its own sake makes him blind to the fact that the inclusion of social and 
economic issues in the green public sphere is not just a matter of broaden-
ing the terms of discourse; it is a question of justice. And, as such, through 
this inclusion, the green public sphere becomes an arena for demands for 
justice, democracy and equality, that is, an arena for action aimed at achiev-
ing certain aims.
Torgerson explicates how environmentalism has shift ed the terms of 
mainstream (industrialist) discourses. Yet he does not go far enough as he 
neglects that transformations in discourses have external aims - and by 
external I mean aims which are not self-referential or do not relate to the 
communication conditions. One of my main arguments is that a politics 
of the green public sphere should pursue those extrinsic aims, if the green 
public sphere is to be part of a normative theory that seeks to democratize 
society. Green public spheres could be thought of as vehicles for emanci-
pation, inclusion, empowerment, and as means to challenge relations of 
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domination in late-capitalist democracies. A green public sphere which 
does not target state and corporate actors, and those institutions that gen-
erate environmental injustice, loses its emancipatory potential to bring 
about social change. Th e neglect of strategic action not only means the 
end of the metaphor of the movement advocated by Torgerson, but also 
the end of all social struggle aimed at challenging privileges by democratic 
means.
Besides being critical, the green public sphere should be infl uential 
and avoid “too much thought at the expense of action” (Connelly, 2006: 
66). Th e concept of the public sphere can inspire an account of politics 
based on free and open discourse amongst citizens, mainly concerned 
with mutual understanding and refl exive learning. But the idea of the 
public sphere can also motivate a view of politics rooted in collective 
action and the (discursive) resolution of social problems (Dryzek, 1990a: 
38-39). With a focus on the fi rst aspect, the accounts of both Torgerson 
and Arendt omit the second one. Torgerson off ers a double foundation of 
deliberation: the intrinsic value of the communicative process and respect 
for diff erence. Th is proceduralist approach contrasts with the so-called 
“epistemic argument for deliberation” (Dryzek, 2000: 174) that looks at 
the increased rationality of outcomes as the justifi cation of discursive poli-
tics. If deliberation is to be related to collective problem solving it needs 
to incorporate this epistemic justifi cation. According to Przeworski, an 
orientation towards the making of decisions that are “binding on a com-
munity” and deal with “how to act collectively” is what makes deliberation 
political (1998: 140). From this point of view, Torgerson’s characterization 
of the green public sphere and the types of deliberation that take place in 
it would be nonpolitical.
But for discourse to be infl uential (as well as critical) it is not enough 
that it aims at collective decision-making and social problem solving – or 
that it is political, in Przeworski’s terms. Deliberations have to be given 
practical form. To put it with Craig Calhoun, 
A public sphere, where it exists and works successfully as a democratic 
institution, represents the potential for the people organized in civil soci-
ety to alter their own conditions of existence by means of rational-critical 
discourse (of course the public sphere represents only potential, because its 
agreements must be brought to fruition, or at least brought into struggle, in 
a world of practical aff airs where power still matters (1993: 279, emphasis in 
the original).
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In this respect, Nancy Fraser notes that a public sphere should generate 
legitimate and effi  cacious public opinion (2005, 2008). Public opinion is 
legitimate when all those potentially aff ected are able to participate, when 
participation is accomplished under conditions of equality and freedom, 
and when public opinion represents the general interest. Public opinion is 
effi  cacious when it is able to constrain political power, when it is deployed 
as a political force to empower citizens versus private interests and to exer-
cise infl uence over the state. Fraser argues that if these two elements – legit-
imacy or validity and political effi  cacy - are missing, “the concept loses its 
critical force and its political point” (2005: 37; 2008: 77). 
In light of these arguments, one should ask whether Torgerson’s con-
cept of the green public sphere is legitimate and eff ective. Th e answer seems 
to be negative if the focus remains on speech that is an end in itself. For 
Torgerson, the green public sphere depends on the quality and form of 
discourse and on openness to citizens’ participation. Th e idea that there 
is purposive debate in the public sphere aimed at generating communica-
tive power that rationalizes state authority and represses private power is 
neglected. His green public sphere observes the condition of legitimacy (yet 
only to a certain extent, since for him deliberation is not always about issues 
of common concern, rather it is mostly about its own conditions) but does 
not perform the function of eff ectiveness, and thus becomes a depoliticized, 
uncritical public sphere.
4. The green public sphere: a reconstruction
Green public spheres are crucial for environmental politics. Yet green polit-
ical theory loses its ability to democratize social and economic relations 
if the focus is placed on a narrow conception of politics and the intrinsic 
value of debate. It is dangerous to emphasize debate that has no purpose, 
that seeks no conclusions and that is kept going for fun, as Torgerson does. 
To suggest that because there is no objective environmental knowledge but 
rather ignorance, uncertainty and complexity, we should abandon purpo-
sive action, is a type of argument that can be appropriated by eco-sceptics. 
Th is attitude, in turn, is very welcome by political and economic elites that 
continue to benefi t from environmental and social injustice.
Although endorsing the intrinsic value of politics and accepting that 
it necessitates the making of a space for debate where people can speak as 
citizens, I seek to stress the purposive dimension of political action that 
leads to progressive, emancipatory aims. Th is position is encouraged by the 
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view that a conception of politics as having intrinsic value is not inconsist-
ent with a notion of politics as being aimed at social change. Value-driven 
purposive action is necessary because existing conditions are very diff erent 
from the deliberative ideal. Precisely because there is injustice and social 
inequality, political activity should aim at redressing these situations so that 
democratic participation and citizenship, both intrinsically valuable, can 
somehow be realized.
Torgerson off ers an idealized notion of the green public sphere that 
ignores power and downgrades socio-economic relations. An alternative 
defi nition is required. It is my contention that the green public sphere could 
better serve democratic green politics if it involves social change to put an 
end to those relationships and practices that are cause and consequence 
of environmental problems. Th is understanding is inspired by the classic 
Habermasian account, which views the public sphere as a normative ideal 
of a space where citizens get together to discuss issues of common concern 
(Calhoun, 1992). For Habermas, a political public sphere refers to those 
“conditions of communication under which there can come into being a 
discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public composed 
of the citizens of the state” (1992: 446). Hence public spheres are a form 
of social interaction and action coordination. Th is conception of the pub-
lic space is appropriate to overcome the limitations of Torgerson’s theory 
insofar as deliberation is not restricted to its own conditions, but aimed at 
making collective decisions. Yet the green public sphere should go beyond 
Habermas’ formulation to avoid its shortcomings, like the exclusion of cer-
tain groups – mainly women, propertyless workers and racial minorities 
– and the lack of attention to economic and family relations.[7] A postbour-
geois public sphere theory needs to respond to egalitarian critiques and 
focus on the politicization of the concerns of traditionally excluded sub-
jects, showing that confi ning their interests to the private realm was part of 
7  See Calhoun (1992), Benhabib (1992) and Fraser (1992) for an overview of such criticisms, 
and Habermas (1992) for a reply to them. Th e bourgeois model of the public sphere is also 
problematized in the light of contemporary transnational processes which challenge its 
Westphalian character (Fraser, 2005, 2008). In addition, the Habermasian picture is vulnerable 
to green objections. Th e main dilemma is that his communicative ethics excludes nature. As a 
result, Whitebook (1996) maintains that the human superiority over the non-human world is 
accepted and domination justifi ed. Although some environmental writers, like Brulle (2000), 
have argued that Habermas’ account allows the incorporation of ecological concerns, there have 
been attempts to correct his antiecological bias by developing an environmental communicative 
ethics that includes human relations with non-humans, particularly by Eckersley (1990, 1992a, 
1992b, 2004) and Dryzek (1990b, 1996). 
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a strategy of domination and oppression. Furthermore, it should highlight 
the limits and contradictions of actually existing democracies (Benhabib, 
1992; Fraser, 1992).
At this point, I would like to suggest that Torgerson’s account could be 
turned around. Discourse in the green public sphere may be oriented to pro-
tecting the natural world and building egalitarian, just societies. From this 
perspective, debate is not self-referential but instrumental to democratically 
discussing and accomplishing particular ways of achieving social equality, 
justice and sustainability, while equality and justice are valued for their own 
sake and not simply because they enhance communicative rationality. Yet 
whatever just, egalitarian and ecologically sustainable may imply, shall be 
a matter of collective debate. By engaging in diff erent ends-oriented dis-
courses, a myriad of meanings can arise and diverse paths can be tried.
What would be the main elements of the re-conceptualization of the 
green public sphere sketched out in this paper? First, the green public 
sphere could be thought of as a vehicle for democratization of all spheres 
of life. As Nancy Fraser contends, stress on deliberation among politically 
equal citizens drift s attention from social inequalities that do actually exist. 
Th e transformation of the “I” into a “we” that takes place with deliberation 
in the public sphere can hide forms of domination and control, and favor 
one particular worldview at the expense of others. Th erefore, it is necessary 
to “unbracket” inequalities and be suspicious about the possibilities of con-
ceiving a space for debate under alleged conditions of equality. Discursive 
spheres are always situated in a broader social frame “pervaded by struc-
tural relations of dominance and subordination” (Fraser, 1992: 120). A 
green public sphere should make evident that social inequalities pervade 
communicative practices and constrain democracy, since they cause rela-
tions of exclusion and subordination. In addition, the green public sphere 
has to deal with questions traditionally relegated to the private realm, to 
the economy, to the sphere of labour and in general to the social and cul-
tural domains of life – and thus excluded in accounts of the public sphere 
like those of Arendt and Torgerson for being non-political or prepolitical. 
Th ese are the spheres were most environmental problems originate so they 
have to be politicized. And these domains, especially the world of labour, 
relate to the socio-natural metabolism. So if labour is excluded from the 
public sphere, then nature is excluded from politics. And the result is, as in 
Torgerson’s picture, a green public sphere without nature.
Second, the public sphere is not just a means for the rationalization 
of domination; it is also a form of social interaction. So the green public 
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sphere has to involve collective decisions. Dryzek notes that critics of dis-
cursive politics have argued that deliberative democracy does not allow 
for collective choice: “we deliberate and then what?”, they ask (2000: 78). 
Similarly, we could ask Torgerson: we play, dance, laugh and then what? 
Without a doubt, environmental political thought requires a communica-
tive ethos and a variety of green public spheres for debate and disagreement. 
But green political theory should not forget that “democratic life is not just 
the endless interplay of discourses. Th ere have to be moments of decisive 
collective action…” (Idem, 78-79). So the green public sphere would be bet-
ter thought of as an arena for instrumental as well as communicative action.
It is useful to recall Fraser’s distinction between “weak publics”, whose 
deliberation is concerned with opinion formation, and “strong publics”, 
devoted not only to opinion formation but also to decision-making (1992: 
134). Torgerson’s green public sphere only deals with opinion formation. 
Indeed he argues that debate about objectives would bring the green pub-
lic sphere to an end. However, as Fraser indicates, a weak conception of 
the public sphere that focuses on discourse and opinion, neglecting issues 
of collective decision-making “denudes ‘public opinion’ of practical force” 
(Idem, 137). Th e type of self-referential debate that Torgerson favours has 
to be complemented with what Habermas defi ned as a “pragmatic discourse 
about what should be done in terms of translating consensus into binding 
decisions capable of implementation, and negotiations concerning what to 
do when values and interests irreducibly confl ict” (Dryzek, 2000: 24-25). 
Th e green public sphere could be expanded in this direction and in this way 
challenge the social-political dualism earlier mentioned.
What issues should be the subject of collective decisions in the green 
public sphere? For Habermas, private concerns are excluded. Torgerson 
and Arendt envisage the public sphere as a site where there is no space 
for either ends-oriented action or social maters (although for Torgerson 
perhaps to a lesser extent than for Arendt). Just as Habermas thought that 
the inclusion of private interests led to the collapse of the bourgeois public 
sphere, Arendt and Torgerson believe that the rise of the social and discus-
sions about objectives would mean the end of the public sphere. However 
this paper has presented arguments to explain why none of these issues 
should be ruled out in principle from debate. Only those engaged in public 
discourse can determine, in the course of deliberation, what questions of 
common interest and collective problems are. 
It is important to note that the fact that deliberation should encom-
pass collective decisions does not mean that it has to be restricted to the 
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common good. As it stems from the discussion illustrated in this article, 
deliberation should also refer to individual needs. Taking distance from 
Habermas, Fraser (1992) and Benhabib (1992) maintain that dealing with 
collective matters does not mean that consensus need to be the necessary 
outcome of deliberation. Following Dryzek, consensus can be defi ned as 
a “unanimous agreement not just on a course of action, but also on the 
reasons for it” (2000: 170). Consensus is not a prerequisite for purposive 
action of the kind advocated here; what is more, consensus can overshadow 
spontaneity and diff erence. As Dryzek observes, “[in] a pluralistic world, 
consensus in unattainable, unnecessary, and undesirable. More feasible and 
attractive are workable agreements in which participants agree on a course 
of action, but for diff erent reasons”, as long as these reasons can be justifi ed 
in public (Ibidem).
Now, for the green public sphere to be eff ective, it is not enough that 
it be oppositional and pursue social and environmental change; collective 
decisions have to be brought to fruition and somehow implemented. Th e 
implementation stage is as important as the deliberative process, since it is 
what confers on the green public sphere its political and critical character. 
Th ere are diff erent ways in which a green public sphere could be eff ective 
and infl uential. Public opinion can have an impact on state policy – or, in 
other words, communicative power may aff ect administrative power. From 
this point of view, public spheres serve as a nexus between society and the 
state. For Habermas the most important tools for transmission of public 
opinion from the public sphere to the state are elections.[8] Yet, as Dryzek 
(Idem) observes, public opinion can be transmitted to the state using diff er-
ent vehicles. Th rough rhetoric, for instance, given discourses are made more 
visible and successful than others and thus have a greater impact on public 
policy. Th is is a discursive mechanism for the transmission of public opinion.
Fraser (2005) retains that if the public sphere does not seek to infl u-
ence state power and authority, it loses its political force and eff ectiveness. 
But in her view, this requires institutional renovation. In this sense, she 
refers to transnational institutions to regulate (already transnationalized) 
private power - which can be confronted, held accountable and infl uenced 
by public opinion - and to global citizenship rights to guarantee participa-
tion beyond the nation state borders. Without this institutional renovation, 
8  Habermas accepts the liberal state channels, like elections, law-making and policy processes. 
Th is approach has been criticized for being “old-fashioned” and not facing the empirical 
realities that suggest extra-constitutional forms of infl uence, like boycotts, demonstrations, or 
media and information campaigns (Dryzek, 2000: 25-27). 
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transnational public spheres and social movements will not succeed. Th ey 
need an institution they can aim at, direct their counterpower at, and seek 
to infl uence, otherwise they cannot “assume the emancipatory democratiz-
ing functions that are the whole point of public sphere theory” (Idem, 46). 
Yet the state is not the only institution capable of organizing collective 
action and the implementation of decisions. Communication in the pub-
lic sphere may produce changes in society and even in private life directly 
without seeking to infl uence the state or the economy (Young, 2000; 
Calhoun, 2001). A focus on civil society as a site for collective self-organi-
zation would be an alternative way of encouraging strong publics oriented 
to decision-making outside the state. Fraser points to “self-managing insti-
tutions” like “self-managed workplaces, child-care centres, or residential 
communities” as strong publics whose “internal institutional public spheres 
could be arenas both of opinion formation and decision making” (1992: 
135). Th is would bring about the articulation of spaces of direct democracy 
or quasi-direct democracy (combined with some form of representation), 
“wherein all those engaged in a collective undertaking would participate in 
deliberations to determine its design and operation” (Ibidem). Th ese argu-
ments reveal the signifi cance of self-determination, “the primary aspect of 
social justice that associative activity outside state and economy promotes” 
(Young, 2000: 180). Th ey also underscore that decision-making can be 
institutionalized in ways that are not constitutionally determined but inter-
nally and autonomously established by members of the public sphere itself.
5. Concluding remarks
Green politics cannot dismiss deliberation and discussion, especially if we 
think about shift s in people’s preferences and attitudes, the desirability of 
forms of action agreed rather than imposed, giving voice to the excluded, 
and collective decision-making. Environmental political theory should 
be concerned about both means and ends, and do not lose track of what 
may be one of its distinctive features: to put into question those aspects of 
contemporary institutions that hold the sustainable society back. To this 
end, the notion of the green public sphere is useful and important. Yet a 
redefi nition seems appropriate. Th is paper has sought to make a contribu-
tion to this task. Drawing predominantly on the insights of contemporary 
critical theory, a more transformative, practical and politicized account has 
been advanced. Th is alternative concept is based on the idea that the green 
public sphere needs to encompass value-driven purposive debate aimed 
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at discussing and reaching decisions about matters of common concern, 
including issues related to ecological sustainability but also questions of 
self-organization, equality and democratization. If we exclude the catego-
ries of labor and work, and privilege action (in Arendt’s terms), or if we 
exclude functional and constitutive politics, and privilege performative 
politics (in Torgerson’s terms), we end up with the exclusion of nature. 
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